Clinton's Kosovo Victory: A Triumph of Will Over Military Triumphs

Strategic Insights -

The sudden capitulation of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has left many wondering if the air war was a military triumph or a triumph of wills. While some credit Bill Clinton's steadfast leadership, the truth lies somewhere in between. As NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana notes, Clinton "always felt the air campaign was ... right, and he never wavered in that belief." But what initially appeared to be a military victory now seems to have been a result of Clinton's ability to outmaneuver Milosevic psychologically, outlasting him in a test of wills.

Key Takeaways:

  • Clinton deserves credit for how the NATO air war ended, particularly for his steadfast leadership in holding NATO leaders together, both at home and within the alliance.
  • The struggle in Kosovo was more about psychology and willpower than about military triumphs, with no one certain what would shake the Yugoslav leader or whether he would succumb to pressures on the home front.
  • Milosevic's surrender was largely a result of Clinton's success in wooing Boris Yeltsin to align Russia with NATO, a diplomatic coup aided by Strobe Talbott's tireless negotiations.
  • The ending of the air war was unpredictable due to the administration's initial blunders and incoherent policy responses, which led to a scramble to figure out a strategy in the middle of the conflict.
  • Clinton's realization that an air war would work, as opposed to a ground war, was crucial in his ultimate success, as the air war depended on the psyche of the enemy rather than territorial gains.

Statistics:

  • The air war lasted for several weeks, during which time Clinton held NATO leaders together despite initial doubts and fears of being humiliated by a tin-pot despot.
  • Over 1 million Kosovar refugees fled their homes as Milosovic's forces began sacking the region, causing a massive humanitarian disaster.
  • The bombing of the Chinese embassy and Clinton's statements ruling out a ground war were notable blunders that threatened to undermine the air war effort.
  • Clinton's ability to outmaneuver Milosevic was aided by NATO leaders' fear of being humiliated by a tin-pot despot, which stiffened spines in Bonn and Paris.

Sources:

  • The Philadelphia Inquirer, May 1999
  • Jacques Chirac, French President
  • Javier Solana, NATO Secretary-General
  • Strobe Talbott, U.S. diplomat
  • Boris Yeltsin, Russian President
  • Trudy Rubin, The Philadelphia Inquirer columnist