Western Diplomacy in Crisis: The Bosnian Conundrum

As the Bosnian conflict escalated into a humanitarian crisis, Western leaders were forced to confront their own divisions and the limitations of their power. A week of intense diplomacy culminated in a Nato decision to prepare for air strikes against Serbian artillery positions, a move that was seen as a u-turn by the British government. The reality, however, was that the decision was influenced by the need to maintain Nato's credibility and cohesion in the face of growing American and French pressure.

Key Takeaways:

The British government's reservations about Nato strikes against Serbian positions in Bosnia were admitted by Prime Minister John Major in a meeting with Boris Pankin, Russia's ambassador in London.
Major told Pankin that Britain feared the consequences of air strikes, and that the decision to use force was influenced by the need to maintain cohesion and solidarity within Nato.
President Bill Clinton cited four compelling interests in persuading Major to adopt a more muscular approach: preventing a broader conflict in Europe, showing that Nato remained a credible force for peace, stemming the flow of refugees, and helping to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo.
The British government's official line on air strikes remained guarded for several days, with Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind opposing the use of bombing during the 22-month siege of Sarajevo.
The Nato decision to prepare for air strikes against Serbian artillery positions was seen as a significant u-turn by the British government, which had long opposed the use of bombing in the conflict.
The French were crucial in winning over the British, with Foreign Minister Alain Juppe declaring that the time had come to act after the massacre in Sarajevo.
The Nato council meeting that led to the decision to use force was an 11-hour affair, with a peace-keeping force, squadrons of bombers, and the international community all players in the complex narrative.
The ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons surrounding Sarajevo or face bombing was seen as a significant escalation of the conflict, with both sides drawing in world leaders.

Statistics:

6,000: The number of French troops in Bosnia
68: The number of civilians killed in the Sarajevo market place shelling on February 5
10 days: The ultimatum given to the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons
11 hours: The length of the Nato council meeting that led to the decision to use force
3,000+ refugees: The estimated number of refugees who had fled to Sarajevo since the conflict began

Sources:

The Sunday Times, February 13, 1994
The Times, February 9, 1994
The Guardian, February 8, 1994
The Independent, February 7, 1994
Nato press release, February 6, 1994