Expanded Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum: Economic Implications and Congressional Oversight

As of 2025, the United States has imposed 50% tariffs on steel, aluminum, and products containing steel and aluminum ("derivatives") from nearly all trading partners, citing national security threats. The tariffs, initially implemented under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, have undergone significant modifications, including increased rates, expanded product coverage, and new exclusion procedures. Congressional analysts and trade experts are now considering the potential economic impacts and benefits of these tariffs, as well as the role of Congress in overseeing trade actions.

Key Takeaways:

• The Trump Administration has significantly expanded the number of steel and aluminum derivatives covered by tariffs, with over 400 product codes added in August 2025.
• The tariffs apply in addition to most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs, trade remedies, tariffs on China under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
• The United States and the European Union have expressed their intent to consider cooperation on steel and aluminum issues, including through potential tariff-rate quotas.
• Canadian and Mexican steel and aluminum products face a 50% tariff but are exempt from IEEPA tariffs on Canadian and Mexican goods.
• The EU voted to reimpose previously suspended retaliatory tariffs but suspended them until 2026 following the conclusion of a U.S.-EU framework agreement.
• Some trading partners have announced retaliatory measures, with Canada imposing 25% tariffs on C$15.6 billion ($11 billion) worth of U.S. steel and aluminum.
• U.S. steel and aluminum imports have declined by value from January to July 2025, compared to the same period in 2024.
• Some U.S. steel producers assert that tariffs are critical for boosting U.S. production and support the expansion of tariffs on derivatives, while other groups argue that rapid tariff expansion has created compliance burdens for businesses and may harm U.S. employment in sectors using steel and aluminum.
• Issues for Congress include considering the potential benefits and costs of steel and aluminum tariffs for the U.S. economy, whether U.S. tariff actions achieve stated policy objectives, and whether these actions are consistent with U.S. international trade obligations.

Statistics:

• 50% tariffs on steel, aluminum, and derivatives from nearly all trading partners (increased from 25% in June 2025).
• Over 400 product codes added to the previously expanded tariff list in August 2025.
• C$15.6 billion ($11 billion) worth of U.S. steel and aluminum imports subject to 25% tariffs from Canada.
• 50% tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Canada and Mexico, exempt from IEEPA tariffs.
• 25% tariffs on aluminum imports from Russia since 2023.
• 200% tariffs on Russian aluminum imports since 2023.
• Estimated 50% decline in U.S. steel and aluminum imports from January to July 2025, compared to the same period in 2024.
• Over 400 product codes covered by steel and aluminum tariffs as of August 2025.

Sources:

• Congressional Research Service, Insight white paper (No. IN12519) on September 25, 2025, by Kyla H. Kitamura and Keigh E. Hammond.
• Presidential proclamations 10895 and 10896.
• U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS).
• U.S. Census Bureau, trade data accessed via Trade Data Monitor, September 25, 2025.
• Congressional bills, including H.R. 735, S. 348, S. 1272/H.R. 2665, H.R. 1903, H.R. 2287, and H.R. 4326.
• U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) report, 2023.