Insufficient Coalition Troops in Iraq: A Failure to Secure a Decent Level of Law, Order, and Security

The images of large-scale fighting in Iraq, portrayed in television shows, are misleading. The actual numbers of killed and wounded, in the low hundreds for the Iraqis and in the low tens for the coalition forces, indicate that the violence is extremely localized. This localized violence is due in part to the intimidation of the less hostile majority by armed extremists, and the presence of fewer than 130,000 U.S. troops and some 20,000 other troops for all of Iraq. The insufficient number of coalition troops has made it impossible to ensure a decent level of law, order, and everyday security for ordinary Iraqis.

Key Takeaways:

• The violence in Iraq is extremely localized, with fewer than 130,000 U.S. troops and some 20,000 other troops for all of Iraq, indicating that the majority of Iraqis prefer the coalition to chaos.
• The images of large-scale fighting in Iraq portrayed in television shows are misleading, as the actual numbers of killed and wounded are in the low hundreds for the Iraqis and in the low tens for the coalition forces.
• The less hostile majority is intimidated by armed extremists, preventing them from speaking out against the violence.
• The grand total of fewer than 150,000 troops in the coalition forces includes a high proportion of civil engineering and other technical units for reconstruction work, with fewer than 70,000 combat formations, including headquarters and support units.
• The coalition has a high proportion of civil engineering and other technical units, with about 35,000 combat troops on duty in a country with almost a million Kalashnikov automatic rifles in private hands.
• The insufficient number of coalition troops has made it impossible to ensure a decent level of law, order, and everyday security for ordinary Iraqis, allowing armed men to attack road traffic with impunity.
• The security situation in Iraq has hindered reconstruction projects, with more than 10,000 expensive foreign security men employed in the country.
• The recruitment, training, and deployment of Iraqi police forces has been rushed, producing poorly trained and disloyal men who cannot be relied upon.
• The defeat of the Mahdi militia of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is likely to have a high political cost, as it will lead to the acceptance of the authority of Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani over the Shia population.
• The Bush administration's plan to secure a relatively quiet Iraq by September by handing over power to a combination of the present Governing Council, Ayatollah al-Sistani and his clerics, and as much UN participation as can be had, is ambitious and may not be successful.

Statistics:

• Fewer than 130,000 U.S. troops and some 20,000 other troops are stationed in Iraq.
• The grand total of fewer than 150,000 troops in the coalition forces includes a high proportion of civil engineering and other technical units for reconstruction work.
• Fewer than 70,000 combat formations, including headquarters and support units, are part of the coalition forces.
• About 35,000 coalition combat troops are on duty in Iraq at any given time.
• Almost a million Kalashnikov automatic rifles are in private hands in Iraq.
• More than 10,000 expensive foreign security men are employed in Iraq to provide security for reconstruction projects.
• The coalition has deployed poorly trained and disloyal Iraqi police forces, with the result that they have surrendered their weapons and cars to insurgents.

Sources:

• EDWARD LUTTWAK, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.