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Intelligence Failures: The Case of the Mobile Weapons Labs in Iraq

Strategic Insights

— 2 min read

As early as May 2002, Pentagon analysts issued a warning about the credibility of an Iraqi informant who had provided evidence of Saddam Hussein's mobile weapons labs. The informant had been coached by the Iraqi National Congress, a group eager to depose Saddam. Despite this warning, the informant's story was included in Secretary of State Colin Powell's address to the U.N. Security Council in February 2003, highlighting the failure of U.S. intelligence agencies to properly cross-reference and communicate information. The CIA's claim that its intelligence had been solid when three suspicious tractor-trailers were found in Iraq after the war has since been discredited, and the origin of the mobile-lab intel is now being examined by Senate investigators and a new bipartisan commission.

Key Takeaways:

  • The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency issued a warning about the credibility of an Iraqi informant who had provided evidence of Saddam Hussein's mobile weapons labs as early as May 2002.
  • The informant had been coached by the Iraqi National Congress, a group eager to depose Saddam.
  • Despite this warning, the informant's story was included in Secretary of State Colin Powell's address to the U.N. Security Council in February 2003.
  • The CIA's claim that its intelligence had been solid when three suspicious tractor-trailers were found in Iraq after the war has since been discredited.
  • CIA Director George Tenet admitted that there was no consensus within the intelligence community over whether the trailers were for weapons use or for the production of hydrogen.
  • David Kay, head of the agency's Iraq Survey Group, believes the trailers weren't used for weapons at all.
  • The transformation of the mobile-lab intel from speculation to fact is a case study in the enduring fallibility of "humint" human intel-gathering and how U.S. agencies fail to communicate.
  • A Powell aide says the secretary learned of the glitch only in the past few weeks, and at least one other of the four Iraqi informants cited by Powell is also now considered to be less than reliable.
  • The genesis of the tale of the mobile weapons labs is now being examined by Senate investigators.
  • A new bipartisan commission, announced by Bush last week, will examine the flawed intelligence on Iraq and the larger issue of why America's intelligence community seems to get so much so wrong.

Statistics:

  • 2002: Year in which Pentagon analysts issued a warning about the credibility of an Iraqi informant.
  • 4: Number of Iraqi informants cited by Secretary of State Colin Powell in his address to the U.N. Security Council.
  • 2003: Year in which three suspicious tractor-trailers were found in Iraq after the war.
  • 10 months: Time period between the discovery of the tractor-trailers and the discrediting of the CIA's claim.
  • 1: Number of officials who say that at least one other of the four Iraqi informants cited by Powell is also now considered to be less than reliable.
  • 1: Number of Senate investigators examining the genesis of the tale of the mobile weapons labs.

Sources:

  • Newsweek, February 16 issue (on newsstands Monday, February 9).
  • Newsweek Investigative Correspondent Mark Hosenball.
  • Newsweek National Security Correspondent John Barry.
  • Newsweek's news releases at www.Newsweek.MSNBC.com (Click "Pressroom").
  • Bush, President of the United States.
  • Colin Powell, Secretary of State.
  • George Tenet, CIA Director.
  • David Kay, former head of the agency's Iraq Survey Group.
  • Iraq National Congress.
  • Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

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