Iraq's Illicit Weapons Stockpiles Destroyed by 1991, Report Finds

Following the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Iraq had destroyed its illicit weapons stockpiles, and by the time of the American invasion in 2003, its ability to produce such weapons had significantly eroded, according to a report by Charles A. Duelfer, the top American inspector for Iraq. The report, totaling 918 pages, concluded that Saddam Hussein had made a fundamental decision to get rid of Iraq's illicit weapons and accept the destruction of its weapons-producing facilities as part of an effort to win an end to United Nations sanctions.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq had destroyed its illicit weapons stockpiles within months after the Persian Gulf War of 1991.
  • By 2003, Iraq's ability to produce illicit weapons had significantly eroded.
  • Saddam Hussein aimed to preserve the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction when sanctions were lifted.
  • There was no evidence of any concerted effort by Iraq to restart its illicit weapons programs.
  • The report concluded that Mr. Hussein had deliberately sought to maintain ambiguity about whether Iraq possessed illicit weapons, mainly as a deterrent to Iran.
  • Interviews with former top Iraqi leaders made clear that Mr. Hussein kept many of his deputies uncertain until the eve of war about whether Iraq possessed illicit weapons.
  • Mr. Hussein never acknowledged in interrogations what had become of Iraq's illicit weapons.
  • The report upheld Iraq's prewar insistence that it did not possess chemical or biological weapons.
  • Iraq had tried to maintain the knowledge base necessary to restart an illicit weapons program, but there were "no indications" that Iraq was pursuing such a course.

Statistics:

  • Iraq destroyed its illicit weapons stockpiles within months after the Persian Gulf War of 1991.
  • By 2003, Iraq's ability to produce illicit weapons had significantly eroded.
  • Iraq presented with the opportunity to produce militarily significant quantities of chemical weapons for at least a year, and years to produce a nuclear weapon.
  • Iraq's last secret factory, a biological weapons plant, was eliminated in 1996.
  • Iraq's nuclear program ended in 1991, with no evidence of attempts to restart it.
  • Iraq's biological program was essentially put "on the shelf" after its last production facility, Al Hakam, was destroyed in 1996.
  • Iraq's illicit schemes amassed more than $11 billion, including $7.5 billion in economic trade agreements.

Sources:

  • Charles A. Duelfer's report
  • The New York Times article
  • Page A28
  • Various public testimonies before the Senate Armed Services Committee