MI6 Drops Iraq Intelligence Sources, Government Seeks to Buried Controversy

The UK Government sought to dispel the controversy surrounding Iraq intelligence after MI6 dropped three main lines of intelligence reporting on Iraq's weapons capabilities. The move follows the release of a report by the Iraq Survey Group, which concluded that Saddam Hussein's regime had no weapons of mass destruction. Despite this, Jack Straw, the former Foreign Secretary, acknowledged that some of the information used to justify the Iraq war was incorrect, but maintained that the Government's decision to take action was justified.

Key Takeaways:

• The UK Government has acknowledged that some of the intelligence used to justify the Iraq war was incorrect, including the claim that Iraq could deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes.
• MI6 has withdrawn its source of intelligence on Iraq's production of biological agents, which was previously described as "seriously flawed".
• The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) drew up the dossier, which was published before the war, and included the 45-minute claim four times.
• Hans Blix, the United Nations' chief weapons inspector, was shown a draft of the dossier in September 2002, shortly before its publication, and was reportedly told that it did not exaggerate the facts.
• Nevertheless, since the war, Dr Blix has strongly criticised the case made for war by Britain and the United States, which was based on Saddam Hussein's supposed possession of illegal WMD.
• Jack Straw said that he did not accept, even with hindsight, that the Government had been wrong to act as it had, given the circumstances it faced at the time.
• The Government has been criticized for its handling of intelligence in the lead-up to the war, with some arguing that it was "sexed up" to strengthen the case for war.

Statistics:

• The 45-minute claim was cited in the Government's dossier on Iraqi weapons and featured eight times in the dossier's summary of the intelligence committee's assessments.
• The dossier was published in September 2002, shortly before the start of the Iraq war.
• Hans Blix was shown a draft of the dossier in September 2002, and reportedly did not have any significant concerns with its contents.
• Adam Bye, an official in the Foreign Office, wrote a note to Jack Straw after meeting Blix, stating that Blix liked section six of the dossier and felt it did not exaggerate the facts nor revert to rhetoric.
• The number of members of the UN Security Council that shared the view that Saddam Hussein posed a threat to international security is not specified in the article.
• The amount of time it would have taken for Iraq to build a nuclear bomb, according to Dr Blix, was at least two years.

Sources:

• "The Times", 2004
• The Iraq Survey Group report
• The Butler report on the Iraq intelligence published in July
• The Intelligence and Security Committee's criticism of the dossier
• Hans Blix's report on the Iraq intelligence published in July
• The JIC's assessments of the intelligence committee's views on Iraq's weapons capabilities