New Revelations in British Government Memos on Bush Administration's Iraq War Plans

A series of British government memos, released in the past few days, have shed new light on the Bush administration's thinking on the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The memos, written in the months leading up to the invasion, reveal that senior British officials were aware of the administration's intention to go to war with Iraq, despite public statements suggesting that war was a last resort. The documents, however, do not provide conclusive proof of a fixed plan to manipulate intelligence to justify the war.

Key Takeaways:

• The British memos suggest that the Bush administration had made up its mind to take military action against Iraq by summer 2002, contradicting public statements by President Bush and other senior officials.
• The memos reveal that British officials were aware of the potential for a prolonged and costly occupation of Iraq, with "a disproportionate share of the burden" potentially falling on the UK.
• The administration's use of intelligence to justify the war has been questioned, with the Senate Intelligence Committee releasing a report last summer that found most key judgments in the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's illicit weapons were "either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting".
• The memos also highlight the contrast between public statements and private deliberations within the administration, with President Bush and other officials making contradictory statements on the prospects of war.
• The recent release of memos has reignited debate over the role of intelligence in the lead-up to the war, with some critics accusing the administration of manipulating intelligence to justify the invasion.
• The Senate Intelligence Committee has announced plans to investigate the administration's use of intelligence, with Senator John D. Rockefeller IV stating that "the committee has an obligation to answer these questions, and the American people deserve answers."
• The memos have been seized upon by opponents of President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, who see the documents as proof of a deliberate attempt to mislead their countries into war.
• The latest memo published, dated July 21, 2002, warns of the potential for a protracted and costly nation-building exercise in Iraq.

Statistics:

• March 31, 2003: Richard N. Haass, then the State Department's director of policy planning, said that in early July 2002 he asked Condoleezza Rice, then national security adviser, whether it made sense to put Iraq at the center of the agenda, with a global campaign against terrorism already under way.
• July 2002: Daily newspapers were filled with details of war plans, which had been seeping out since late spring, and internal administration disputes over whether the planning was adequate.
• August 2002: Vice President Dick Cheney made a bellicose speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, in which he warned that a return of United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq "would provide no assurance whatsoever" of Mr. Hussein's compliance.
• October 2002: The National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's illicit weapons was released, with the Senate Intelligence Committee later finding that most key judgments were "either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting".
• 2003: The Senate Intelligence Committee issued a unanimous report criticizing the use of intelligence in the lead-up to the war.

Sources:

• "The New Yorker," March 31, 2003
• White House transcripts
• "The Times of London," [Downing Street memo]
• Senate Intelligence Committee Report
• "The Washington Post"

Please note, if a source is missing or if you would like to revise any of the analysis from the original text, please don't hesitate to let me know.