The Microsoft-Google Rivalry: A Historic Clash with Uncertain Outcomes

The technological landscape is witnessing a titanic corporate clash between Microsoft and Google, two powerhouses vying for dominance in the realms of computing and Internet services. This rivalry has sparked concerns that Microsoft's past successes may be an anchor holding the company back, making it vulnerable to the changing market dynamics. Historians and management experts are drawing parallels with past industries, such as mass-market retailing and automobiles, to shed light on how this rivalry might unfold.

Key Takeaways:

• The Microsoft-Google confrontation may shape the future of competition in computing and how people use information technology.
• Past success can be an anchor holding a company back, as seen in the cases of Montgomery Ward and Ford, which failed to adapt to changing market dynamics.
• The war for talent is a crucial aspect of this rivalry, with Microsoft suing Google and former employee Kai-Fu Lee over a noncompete clause.
• Microsoft has a history of adapting to big challenges, catching up to Apple's Macintosh and Netscape Communications, but may struggle with Google's free Web-based services and global ambitions.
• Google's plan to expand its services, such as email and word processing, could potentially replace Microsoft's desktop programs, impacting Microsoft's lucrative software business.
• Eric E. Schmidt, Google's CEO, is cagey about the company's strategy, but hints at Google's limitless potential and ambitions.
• The annual media day for Google's executives may provide clues about the company's plans and future direction.

Statistics:

• Microsoft has $35 billion in cash to finance its competitive foray, while Google has about $8 billion.
• In 1945, Robert E. Wood, a former Army general, left Montgomery Ward to join Sears, where he played a crucial role in shaping the company's response to changing market trends.
• Sears had sales of $3 billion by 1953, while Montgomery Ward's sales were $1 billion.
• Ford's share of the American market fell to 45 percent by 1925, from 57 percent two years earlier, as General Motors and Toyota rose to dominance.
• Toyota manufactured 13,000 cars in 1950, equivalent to a day's production for General Motors.

Sources:

• The New York Times
• Harvard Business School
• Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
• Institute for the Future, Silicon Valley
• Walker
• Harvard University Press
• Bloomberg News
• Dan Acker
• Author's own knowledge